The Shopping Center Radius Clause: Candidate for Antitrust by Steele, Elizabeth
SMU Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 3 Article 5
1978
The Shopping Center Radius Clause: Candidate for
Antitrust
Elizabeth Steele
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Steele, The Shopping Center Radius Clause: Candidate for Antitrust, 32 Sw L.J. 825 (1978)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol32/iss3/5
THE SHOPPING CENTER RADIUS CLAUSE: CANDIDATE
FOR ANTITRUST?
by Elizabeth Steele
The suburban shopping center is a twentieth century phenomenon.,
Although incipient models of modern shopping centers emerged early in
the century,2 the substantial population shift to suburban areas and in-
creasing dependence on automobiles which followed in the wake of World
War II were the impetus for their development.' The business of shop-
ping center construction, which surfaced in 1940, skyrocketed after the
war.4 By 1976 these centers accounted for forty-four percent of all retail
sales in the United States,5 a clear indication that the suburban retail shop-
ping center plays a significant role in modern economic development.
Retailing is perhaps the most competitive business in the United States.6
That one of its most significant developments during the past decade has
been the growth of planned shopping centers7 strongly indicates that shop-
ping center development is itself a highly competitive industry.8 In re-
sponse, private entrepreneurial developers have frequently included
various restrictive clauses designed to protect themselves or their tenants in
the lease of shopping center space. In the past, legal conflicts over such
clauses have been analyzed in terms of property or contract principles. 9
As the number and importance of shopping centers in the fabric of com-
merce has increased, however, such clauses have inevitably become subject
1. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESSES, THE IMPACT OF SUBURBAN
SHOPPING CENTERS ON INDEPENDENT RETAILERS, S. REP. No. 1016, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1959) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
2. See S. FEINBERG, WHAT MAKES SHOPPING CENTERS TICK 3 (1960).
3. See Rawley & Donohoe, Antitrust Implications of Tenant Selection Practices in Re-
gional Shopping Centers, 11 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 899, 899 (1970). See also S. FEIN-
BERG, supra note 2, at 3.
4. See URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, THE COMMUNITY BUILDER'S HANDBOOK 271, 272
(5th ed. J. McKeever 1968) [hereinafter cited as COMMUNITY BUILDER]. Present estimates
set the number of shopping centers in the United States and Canada at 18,540 in 1976. See
A. GALLION & S. EISNER, THE URBAN PATrERN 26 (3d ed. 1975). Experts predict that the
United States figure will reach 21,000 by 1980. See Complaint, Gimbel Bros., [1970-1973
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,834 (1971); Complaint, Tysons Comer Re-
gional Shopping Center, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 19,720
(1971).
5. See Why Shopping Centers Rode Out the Storm, FORBES, June, 1976, at 35. This
data excludes household and automotive centers.
6. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS, ANTITRUST UPDATE: THE SHOP-
PING CENTER INDUSTRY AND ANTITRUST LAWS 5 (1974) (comment of Leon Solis-Cohen,
Jr.) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST UPDATE].
7. See D. WARNER, MARKETING AND DISTRIBUTION-AN OVERVIEW 336 (1969).
8. ANTITRUST UPDATE, supra note 6, at 5.
9. Comment, The Antitrust Implications of Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center
Leases, 18 VILL. L. REV. 721, 721 & n.3 (1973).
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to scrutiny under the antitrust laws. I°
One such clause, the "radius" clause, which is typically included in
shopping center leases, has as yet escaped definitive antitrust treatment."'
Nevertheless, a challenge appears inevitable. In light of such prospective
litigation, this Comment analyzes the potential federal antitrust challenges
to which the radius clause may be subject.
I. THE MODERN SHOPPING CENTER AND EARLY LEGAL CHALLENGES
There are three basic categories of shopping centers-neighborhood,
community, and regional.' 2 The nature of each is determined more by the
nature of its major tenants than by its location or building size.' 3 A neigh-
borhood center has as its principal tenant a food supermarket, generally
surrounded by several satellite stores, and is designed to satisfy the sur-
rounding neighborhood's needs for convenience goods.' 4 Next in size is
the community center, whose tenants include a junior line department
store 15 or variety store, in addition to supermarket and miscellaneous
smaller stores.'6 Finally there is the regional center, the focus of much
recent litigation and the central concern of this Comment."' The regional
center has as its anchor tenant at least one full line department store of
local or national ownership,'" and various satellite stores which provide
the center's component offering of shopping goods. A variation of the
regional center is the super-regional center which includes three or more
department stores and significantly greater floor space. 9
Before embarking on the project of developing a regional shopping
center, the foresighted entrepreneur engages in a market analysis designed
to project the center's ultimate cost and the likelihood of success. The
most rudimentary analysis20 first takes into account the projected trade
area, that is, the area containing people who are likely to purchase a given
class of goods or services from a particular firm or group of firms, and then
10. See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, SHOPPING CENTERS 1976, at 254 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SHOPPING CENTERS 1976].
11. For an extensive empirical analysis of the current status of radius clauses in shop-
ping center leases, -see Lentzner, The Antitrust Implications of Radius Clauses in Shopping
Center Leases, 55 J. URB. L. 1 (1978).
12. URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, SHOPPING CENTER DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK 3 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK].
13. Id.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 81.
16. Id. at 4-5.
17. While suburban and neighborhood centers are more numerous, the restrictive im-
pact of radius clauses is more easily demonstrated, and hence analyzed, in the case of the
regional center; the basic antitrust analysis would, however, be the same for each kind.
18. Tenants fall into three categories: the national chain store, which is part of business
operations in four or more metropolitan areas in three or more states; the independent store,
which has business operations in not more than two outlets in one metropolitan area; and
the local chain store, which does not fall into either of the other categories. DEVELOPMENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 71.
19. Id.
20. For a more thorough discussion of market analysis, see COMMUNITY BUILDER,
supra note 4, at 287-98.
[Vol. 32
COMMENTS
considers its net spendable income and existing and potential competi-
tion.2' These factors are evaluated in light of the proposed tenant compo-
sition and estimated sales volume to determine whether the area can
support a new shopping center. The guiding criterion in shaping the ten-
ant composition is close duplication of the ranges in price and merchan-
dise once found only in the central business district.2"
Development of the tenant mix begins with the search for anchor
tenants, 23 whose selection is as important to the developmental stages as it
is to the center's ultimate operation. Firm commitments from blue chip
triple-A tenants, usually department stores, are crucial to securing mort-
gage financing.24 Furthermore, the anchor tenant's image is important in
drawing smaller satellite tenants to the center,25 and, once the center has
opened, the anchor tenant generates the major volume of customer traf-
fic.26 Because the developer is so concerned with securing commitments
from anchor tenants, he may be willing to grant various concessions such
as low base rentals, 27 low percentage rent, 28 "exclusive" clauses assuring
that the store will be the only one of a particular type,29 or provisions for
store participation in subsequent tenant selection decisions.3" To secure
his own interests, the developer may demand a variety of primary provi-
sions specifying that the tenant operate continuously,3' that the tenant en-
gage in a particular type of business, 32 and the terms of rental;33 he may
21. See id. at 277, which cautions the developer against projecting a shopping center's
success solely on purchasing power within the trade area without gauging the competitive
draw of other retail facilities within the area.
22. See DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 69. The classic central business
district model of tenant composition is copied not because downtown represents the shop-
ping center's primary competition but because it represents an optimal mix of retailers. Sig-
nificantly, it is this mix which the shopping center's competitors, i.e., other shopping centers,
will seek to duplicate.
23. See Eagle, Shopping Center Controk The Developer Besieged, 51 J. URB. L. 585, 599
(1974).
24. See Rawley & Donohoe, supra note 3, at 899; SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-
11. For a general discussion of sources and methods of financing, see Rogers & Brown,
Shopping Center Financing, 43 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 1 (1974).
25. Cf COMMUNITY BUILDER, supra note 4, at 284 n.21 (indicating that the anchor's
image will determine the type of customers who will be drawn, hence the type of satellites
who will be attracted to the shopping center).
26. See DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 81; Eagle, supra note 23, at 601.
27. See Eagle, supra note 23, at 600.
28. See S. FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 31.
29. See SHOPPING CENTERS 1976, supra note 10, at 249, for an explanation of the pur-
pose of the exclusive clause.
30. An illuminating example of developer concessions to department store control of
center decisions is the recently invalidated Sears lease containing provisions which condi-
tioned any store's entry into the center on Sears' approval, and gave Sears the right to ap-
prove the tenant's total floor space, to specify the price range, fashion, type, or quality of
merchandise sold, to limit discount advertising, pricing, or selling, to prescribe the hours of
operation, and to approve the store's location. See Consent Order, Sears Roebuck & Co.,
[1977] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,218, at 21,122.
31. See, e.g., International Council of Shopping Centers, Inc., Recommended Form §
6.02, reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SHOP-
PING CENTERS app. B, at 169 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS].
32. See, e.g., id. § 6.01, at 169.
33. See, e.g., id. §§ 2.01-.02, at 167.
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also demand secondary provisions34 which give him a comprehensive reg-
ulatory power over the business conduct of the individual merchants.
From the developer's viewpoint, such lease covenants, while undeniably
restrictive to smaller operations, are the price such operations must pay for
the benefits of participating in a prime shopping center area.35
The first antitrust challenge to a restrictive lease covenant in a shopping
center context arose in Savon Gas Stations Number Six, Inc. v. Shell Oil
C0. 36 In Savon the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that
an exclusive covenant providing that defendant Shell be the only gas sta-
tion in the center was not an unreasonable restraint of trade under federal
and state antitrust law.37 Next, in Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tysons Corner Re-
gional Shopping Center38 plaintiff Dalmo Sales Co. contended that it had
been excluded from the shopping center because certain key tenants had
exercised exclusionary veto powers contained in their leases, and that this
constituted a group boycott. The court denied the request for injunctive
relief to prevent leasing of the contested retail space to another store, stat-
ing that Dalmo had not met its burden of showing substantial likelihood of
success at trial on the merits.39
The Dalmo case, however, was taken up by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion,4" which issued a complaint against Tysons Corner and its three major
department store tenants.41 Almost contemporaneously, the FTC filed a
similar complaint against Gimbels Bros.,42 beginning what was to become
an extensive investigation of such restrictive covenants. At issue in both
Tysons Corner and Gimbels were lease provisions granting key tenants the
34. See, e.g., id. §§ 5.01-.05, at 168-69 (dealing with construction, alteration, relocation
and financing of improvements and additions); id. § 6.03, at 169 (noncompetition clause);
id. §§ 11.0 1-.04, at 171 (dealing with the installation and removal of signs, awnings, fixtures,
etc.); id. §§ 18.01-.03, at 174 (dealing with restrictions on advertising and membership in the
merchant's association).
35. See Kucker, A Rebuttal to Plum Tree, SHOPPING CENTER WORLD, Aug. 1972, at 44,
46.
36. 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963).
37. 309 F.2d at 310.
38. 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
39. 308 F. Supp. at 989, 993.
40. In this and subsequent shopping center challenges, the FTC has relied on § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act which declares unlawful "[uinfair methods of competition
. . . and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
Although early decisions interpreted this section narrowly, the Supreme Court soon made it
clear that the Commission could invoke § 5 to challenge conduct that constitutes an "incipi-
ent" Sherman Act violation. See, e.g., FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344
U.S. 392 (1953); FTC v. Beech Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). Gradually, § 5 was
construed to prohibit trade practices which may conflict with, though not necessarily violate,
the basic policy of federal antitrust law. See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316(1966). FTC v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972), provides the most expansive
reading to date of the Commission's authority to go beyond the letter and the spirit of fed-
eral antitrust law in defining unfair competition.
41. Complaint, Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,720 (1971). For full text of the complaint, see ANTITRUST
UPDATE, supra note 6, at 30-34.
42. Complaint, Gimbels Bros., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1




right to disapprove leases to prospective tenants, the right to limit floor
space available to other tenants, and the power to exercise continuing con-
trol over the conduct of the satellite tenants' business operations.43 The
FTC charged that these clauses were restraints of trade under the Sherman
Act," as well as unfair methods of competition within the scope of the
FTC Act. 45  Gimbels and all but one of the respondents in the Tysons
Corner investigation settled the administrative litigation by consent de-
cree, under which they agreed to cease and desist from numerous anticom-
petitive practices in connection with their lease of shopping center space.46
City Store, however, elected to litigate, contending that the mere exist-
ence of unexercised exclusionary powers did not constitute an antitrust vi-
olation.47 The result was significant. In its final order to cease and desist
the FTC ruled that the approval rights encompassed in the lease created an
imminent danger of per se anticompetitive harm. Because the arguably
legitimate business objectives which might be furthered by the agreement
could be secured by substantially less restrictive means, the Commission
ordered the lease reformed.48 While the impact of an FTC consent order
is qualified in that it is deemed to apply only to those parties subject to the
order,49 the wider implications of this order are important. It demonstrates
that the FTC is not only willing to investigate lease provisions of a restric-
tive nature, but is also prepared to call to muster per se illegality5" in pur-
suit.
Subsequent cases in which the FTC has attacked similar restrictive lease
provisions have likewise terminated in consent orders.51 All have been
attacks on lease restrictions included for the benefit of a major tenant.
43. Complaint, Gimbels Bros., ANTITRUST UPDATE, supra note 6, at 26. Complaint,
Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, ANTITRUST UPDATE, supra note 6, at 32. See
also [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,003, at 22,004 (1972).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-59 (1976); See Complaint, Gimbels Bros., ANTITRUST UPDATE,
supra note 6, at 26; Complaint, Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, ANTITRUST UP-
DATE, supra note 6, at 32. See also [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,003, at 22,004 (1972).
46. Consent Order, Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, [1973-1976 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,532 (1974); Final Order, May Dept. Stores, Inc.,
ANTITRUST UPDATE, supra note 6, at 38-39; Consent Order, Woodward & Lothrop, ANTI-
TRUST UPDATE, supra note 6, at 40-41; Consent Order, Gimbel Bros., [1973-1976 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,478 (1974).
47. Final Order, Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center [City Store], [1973-1976
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,933, at 20,771 (1975).
48. Id. at 20,776.
49. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS, FTC UPDATE 5 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as FTC UPDATE]. See also ANTITRUST UPDATE, supra note 6, at 20. A
final order of the FTC may be used as prima facie evidence of the violation in subsequent
private action under the Sherman Act. FTC UPDATE at 8.
50. See text accompanying notes 158-66 infra.
51. See, e.g., Consent Order, Sears Roebuck Co., [1977] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1
21,218; Consent Order, Rich's, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $
21,118 (1976); Consent Order, Strawbridge & Clothier, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 21,082 (1976); Consent Order, Peoples Drug Store, Inc., [1973-1976
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,005 (1975); Consent Order, Food Fair
Stores, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,946 (1975).
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Recent challenges to restrictive covenants by private plaintiffs have tack-
led exclusions,5 2 exclusives,5 3 and other landlord concessions54 with vary-
ing success.
Developer-landlords, however, are becoming apprehensive. 5 The con-
tinued validity of the radius clause has generated particular concern.5 6
Although such lease provisions have been challenged as antitrust viola-
tions,57 their legality has not been finally litigated. 8 Nevertheless, defini-
tive court treatment of the radius clause seems inevitable.
II. DEFINITION OF THE RADIUS CLAUSE
The radius clause is a counterpart to the exclusive clause. 9 By an ex-
clusive clause, the landlord covenants that the tenant will be the only
lessee primarily engaged in a certain business within a certain area, the
shopping center itself or other property that is under the landlord's con-
52. See, e.g., Plum Tree, Inc. v. N. K. Winston Corp., 351 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(dismissed per stipulation); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 343 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa.), mo-
tion/or class action determination denied, 58 F.R.D. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (dismissed per stipu-
lation); State v. Frouge Corp., [1976-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,804 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb.
6, 1976). State ex rel. Brown v. Zayre, [1974-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 75,232 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County, Ohio Aug. 2, 1974).
53. See, e.g., Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc. v. City Prods. Corp., [1975-2] TRADE
CAS. (CCH) 60,385 (D. Ore. June 18, 1975); Borman's Inc. v. Great Scott Super Mkts.,
Inc., [1975-I] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,321 (E.D. Mich. May 9, 1975); United States v. Wa-
chovia Bank & Trust Co., [1972] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,109 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 5, 1972);
State exrel. Brown v. Palzes, [1973-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,764 (C.P. Cuyahoga County,
Ohio Nov. 2, 1973).
54. See, e.g., Amajac Ltd. v. Northlake Mall, [1972] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,099 (N.D.
Ga. July 24, 1972).
55. See DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 136 n.6; SHOPPING CENTERS
1976, supra note 10, at 73-134, 243-48; Pollack, Clauses in a Shopping Center Lease, 20
PRAc. LAW., Dec. 1974, at 73. See generally ANTITRUST UPDATE, supra note 6.
56. See generally SHOPPING CENTERS 1976, supra note 10, at 249-74. For examples of
typical radius clauses, see BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 31, § 6.03, at 160;
SHOPPING CENTERS 1976, supra note 10, at 251.
57. See Consent Order, Sears Roebuck Co., [1977] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,218,
at 21,122; Consent Order, Strawbridge & Clothier, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 21,082, at 20,944 (1976); Plum Tree, Inc. v. N.K. Winston Corp., 351 F. Supp.
80, 86 n.60 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 58 F.R.D. 373, 374 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
58. Both Plum Tree suits were settled before the issues were fully litigated. See note 52
supra. The Strawbridge investigation terminated in a consent order that provided, inter
alia, that Strawbridge cease and desist from making, carrying out, or enforcing agreements
with the effect of "restricting the uses to which fringe areas or expansion areas of shopping
centers may be developed or limiting the expansion of the shopping center." Consent Or-
der, Strawbridge & Clothier, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,082, at 20,944 (1976). Similarly, the consent order in the Sears investigation prohibited
any direct or indirect form of agreement which "provides for radius restrictions upon any
tenant in a shopping center." Consent Order, Sears Roebuck Co., [1977] 3 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 1 21,218, at 21,123.
Two such complaints have been filed in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas: First Lady Beauty Salon v. Nasher, No. 77-0074 (N.D. Tex., filed Jan. 18,
1977); Associated Dry Goods v. Nasher, No. 76-0681 (N.D. Tex., filed May 14, 1976), dis-
missed by order, No. 76-0681 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1978).




trol,6° in order to minimize competition and thereby increase the tenant's
business prospects. By a radius clause, the tenant covenants that he will
not conduct a competing business within designated environs, usually
measured in terms of a straight line radius from the shopping center. 6'
The primary justification for requiring such corresponding commitments is
to protect the landlord who depends on income from a percentage rental
agreement.62
The percentage provision is a standard real estate provision in most re-
tail leases,63 particularly those of the shopping center industry.64 Al-
though a number of variations are possible, the most prevalent provides
for a guaranteed minimum rental income sufficient to pay the landlord's
carrying charges and permit a modest return on his investment, plus a
specified percentage of any gross sales above that base rental amount.65
Developers contend that the percentage lease reflects the basic economic
principle that the buyer pay for what he purchases. The shopping center
tenant purchases the intangible advantages of location and competitive ap-
peal.66 If the property is productive, the tenant's business should reflect
such productivity 7 and easily accommodate the percentage above base
premium. If the property is unproductive, the the tenant is responsible
only for the minimum rental, thereby cushioning his loss during periods of
economic downturn.
The lessor derives several advantages from the percentage lease. One is
the assurance that, unlike a fixed rental income, the return on a percentage
lease will not be adversely affected by changes in the future buying power
of money or increases in maintenance costs in an inflationary economy.68
Further, such a lease enables him to participate in the success of the center.
This premium for the center's success provides an increased yield on his
investment, and supplies the incentive to develop and promote after initial
69creation.
60. See cases cited at note 142 infra.
61. See Pollack, Shopping Center Leases, 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 391-92 (1961).
62. See Eagle, supra note 23, at 620; Pollack, supra note 61, at 391.
63. S. MCMICHAEL & P. O'KEEFE, LEASES-PERCENTAGE, SHORT AND LONG TERM 34
(6th ed. 1974).
64. COMMUNITY BUILDER, supra note 4, at 416-17.
65. S. MCMICHAEL & P. O'KEEFE, supra note 63, at 34, enumerates three other possible
percentage rental arrangements in addition to the base plus specified percentage. The first
two are similar-specified percentage of gross sales without a guaranteed minimum and
specified percentage of gross sales in addition to a minimum to be established after a fixed
time. The third version designates rental as a straight percentage of profits. These are
generally offered by a developer who is in a subordinate bargaining position, attributable
either to poor location or to a recalcitrant tenant. As a result of the lease terms, he may
encounter difficulties in securing adequate mortgage financing. See also Landis, Problems
in Drafting Percentage Leases, 36 B.U.L. REv. 190, 190 (1956), indicating that the landlord
who has difficulty attracting tenants may lower or omit the minimum base and thereby
allow his lessees to share his business risk.
66. S. MCMICHAEL & P. O'KEEFE, supra note 63, at 36.
67. See Colbourn, A Guide to Problems in Shopping Center Leases, 29 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 56, 58 (1962).
68. Id.
69. COMMUNITY BUILDER, supra note 4, at 418.
1978]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
The disadvantage to the landlord is that he places his earning potential
almost entirely in the hands of the tenant." Without covenants regulat-
ing, to some extent, the operation of the tenant's business, the landlord is
entirely dependent upon the protection of the courts. In the past, courts
have been willing to support landlords' rights under percentage leases to
the extent of implying a tenant's covenant to operate the business where
there is no fixed minimum71 or according damages for nonoperation
where the minimum is clearly inadequate.72 Nevertheless, the landlord
whose lease contains no covenant regulating such conduct is effectively
without remedy should a tenant divert business to another store. Just as
base rentals which appear adequate73 have dissuaded courts from finding
implied covenants to operate and generate the percentage income,74 so also
have such adequate rentals militated against implied covenants to devote
all efforts to one operation75 or landlord entitlement to some percentage of
a second operation's proceeds.76 In light of these difficulties it is easy to
understand why the landlord to whom anticipated excess rentals are the
prime incentive of the percentage lease 77 includes a radius clause as stan-
dard fare in such leases.
In actual practice, however, percentage rental income may not be the
landlord's sole motivation in including a radius provision. Generally,
minimum base rents for major tenants, such as department stores, are
low, 78 and the rate of return on department store leases is usually marginal
70. S. MCMICHAEL & P. O'KEEFE, supra note 63, at 36.
71. See, e.g., Marvin Drug Co. v. Couch, 134 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1936, writ dism'd judgmt cor.); cf. Stockton Dry Goods Co. v. Girsh, 221 P.2d 186 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1950), rev'don other grounds, 36 Cal. 2d 677, 227 P.2d 1 (1951); Seggebruch v. Stosor,
309 Ill. App. 385, 33 N.E.2d 159 (1941); Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstader's Shoe Stores, 194
La. 654, 194 So. 579 (1940) (all dealing with implied covenants of conduct of business).
72. See, e.g., Professional Bldg. v. Anita Frocks, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 2d 276, 2 Cal. Rptr.
914 (1960); Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955); Simhawk
Corp. v. Egler, 52 Ill. App. 2d 449, 202 N.E.2d 49 (1964); Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, 8
Ill. 2d 571, 134 N.E.2d 806 (1956); Slidell Inv. Co. v. City Prod. Corp., 202 So. 2d 323 (La.
1967).
73. See text accompanying notes 223-34 infra.
74. See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. Bonny Corp., 134 Ga. App. 834, 216 S.E.2d 341 (1975); Stop
& Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248 (1964); Jenkins v. Roses, 213 N.C.
606, 197 S.E. 174 (1938); Monte Corp. v. Stephens, 324 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1958); Weil v. Ann
Lewis Shops, Inc., 281 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955, no writ); cf Dickey
v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954) (conduct of specific
business not implied); Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc., 560
P.2d 700 (Utah 1977) (manner of operation not implied).
75. See Percoff v. Solomon, 259 Ala. 482, 67 So. 2d 31 (1953).
76. See, e.g., Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 Cal. App. 2d 376, 233 P.2d 586 (1951); Cousins
Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 113 P.2d 878 (1941); Tuttle v. W.T.
Grant Co., 5 App. Div. 370, 171 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1958); Kretch v. Stark, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 385,
193 N.E.2d 307 (1962); Palm v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 229 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1950, no writ).
77. Morris, Shopping Centers-The Role of the Lawyer, 1955 U. ILL. L.F. 681, 701.
78. Id. at 689. See also Pollack, Clauses in a Shopping Center Lease, 20 PR c. LAW.,
Dec. 1974, at 65. Because AAA-rated department stores can command the prime rate on
the market, they are naturally interested only in a rental structure which will bear the prime
rate. BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 31, at 67.
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or nonexistent. 79  The developer, therefore, must look to the satellite ten-
ants for a fair return on his investment.8" Thus, while the large depart-
ment store is in many respects the developer's parasite, without it he will
be unable to attract the bread and butter satellites. 8 1 Moreover, a depart-
ment store provides the major drawing power of a shopping center, en-
abling the satellites to operate profitably.82 In light of the developer's
concern with promoting the success of his venture, a radius clause may
well be intended to operate as a restraint on a department store's ability to
expand to a second site at another shopping center 83 and thereby divert
some of the center's overall traffic and income.84
The restrictive effect is magnified when, as in the super-regional shop-
ping center situation, not one, but four such concerns are restrained. Sim-
ilarly, when the developer employs a standard lease and radius restriction
for all satellite tenants, regardless of the individual size or nature of the
particular business, the radius clause may be unduly restrictive. The va-
lidity of such restraint, in light of federal antitrust law, is the concern of the
remainder of this Comment.
79. See COMMUNITY BUILDER, supra note 4, at 419. For a comparison of the median
total rent per square foot of gross leaseable area (GLA) of department stores to that paid by
other popular shopping center tenants, see URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, DOLLARS AND CENTS
OF SHOPPING CENTERS 1975, at 70, 71 (1975) [hereinafter cited as DOLLARS AND CENTS].
80. In terms of gross dollars, the department store is likely to be the developer's single
largest rent producer. See Morris, supra note 77, at 688. See also COMMUNITY BUILDER,
supra note 4, at 421. It is not difficult to surmise, however, that the bulk of the developer's
rental income in relation to total leased area is generated by the satellite tenants. For exam-
ple, the GLA of a typical super-regional shopping center might fall in the range of 940,000
square feet. The median rent receipts of nondepartment store mall shops, ie., satellite
stores, is $4.09 ($3.44 minimum rental plus $.65 overage) per square foot. DOLLARS AND
CENTS, supra note 79, at 19, 20 (table 3-6). The median gross leaseable area of these mall
shops is 400,000 square feet. Id. at 14 (table 3-1). By comparison, the median total rent
per square foot for one department store is $1.42, and the median gross leaseable area is
180,000 square feet. Id. at 23 (table 3-11). Given this example, it is interesting to note that
roughly 70% of store rental income from such a center containing three department stores
would be generated by roughly 40% of store-occupied space.
81. BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 31, at 36.
82. COMMUNITY BUILDER, supra note 4, at 419 (comment of Richard M. Hurp). A
concise statement of this theory can be found in Shactman v. Masters-Lake Success, Inc.,
222 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd without opinion, 16 App. Div. 2d 679, 227 N.Y.S.2d
247 (1962), in which the lessor sued to enjoin the tenant's violation of the radius clause and
recover damages. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant "is a key tenant which attracts a
great number of customers, thereby contributing to the business of other tenants in the shop-
ping area, and increasing the percentage rent payable by defendants to the plaintiffs." 222
N.Y.S.2d at 172. Significantly, the lessor also elaborated on the tenant's knowledge of his
important position in the shopping center and the probable consequences of his breach.
The court did not reach the merits, but dismissed the defendant's motion to strike, finding
the plaintiffs pleadings sufficient to allege a cause of action.
83. A free-standing store that is not a part of a larger organized merchandising develop-
ment would not be a practical alternative to rental space in a second center because such
stores are at so distinct a competitive disadvantage relative to those in regional centers. See
Note, The Antitrust Implications o' Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center Leases, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1209-10 (1973).
84. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS, THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION AND SHOPPING CENTERS: PROCEEDINGS OF A SPECIAL SYMPOSIUM AT THE AN-
NUAL CONVENTION OF THE INTEtNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS 7 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS'..
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III. FEDERAL JURISDICTION TO CHALLENGE
A threshold question in the analysis of any restrictive covenant is
whether the conduct required by the covenant so involves interstate com-
merce as to bring it under the ambit of Sherman Act jurisdiction. Section
1 declares unlawful only those contracts, combinations, and conspiracies
which are "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states."85
Section 2 is concerned with attempts to monopolize or conspiracies to mo-
nopolize "any part of trade or commerce among the several states."
86
Since the more restrained reading of the Act in the early cases, 87 the courts
have expanded their conception of its scope to embrace wholly local busi-
ness restraints which have a deleterious effect on interstate commerce.
88
Yet conduct that may be characterized as "essentially local," having only
an incidental effect on interstate commerce, can still be said to fall outside
that jurisdiction.89 The initial difficulty in any antitrust challenge9" to a
restrictive radius clause in a lease will therefore be to demonstrate that the
leasing of retail space, a transaction of acknowledged local character,9 '
sufficiently involves interstate commerce as to invoke the Sherman Act.
The courts apply two tests in determining whether particular conduct
falls under the Sherman Act. Under the "in commerce" test, any activity
which occurs within the flow of interstate commerce and affects that flow
is conclusively presumed to confer jurisdiction.92 In contrast, the "affect-
ing commerce" test demands that the activity have an effect which is more
than insubstantial. Thus, under the "affecting commerce" test, a purely
intrastate activity can fall under the aegis of the Act if its quantitative ef-
fect on interstate commerce is deemed sufficient.93
Early court decisions dealing with Sherman Act challenges to restrictive
lease covenants denied that the particular concern was in commerce or had
more than an incidental effect on commerce. In Savon Gas Stations
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
86. Id. § 2.
87. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the first Sherman Act case
to reach the Supreme Court. The Court refused to reach the validity of a series of mergers in
the sugar refining industry. Instead, the Court held that the Act did not extend to restraints
affecting manufacture on the ground that it was an essentially intrastate operation, notwith-
standing the fact that the vast part of the sugar produced was sold and shipped in interstate
commerce.
88. See United States v. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
89. See Krotinger, The "Essentially Local" Doctrine and Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
15 W. RES. L. REV. 66, 71, 75-76 (1963).
90. The Sherman Act is enforced by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department,
which has broad investigative powers and which may institute a civil action for injunctive or
other relief or seek criminal sanctions. In addition, private persons who have been injured
by Sherman Act violations may bring actions in federal courts for treble damages, injunctive
relief, or both. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15 (1976).
91. See Gaylord Shops, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping
Center, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 400, 403 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
92. See Flittie, The Sherman Act Section One Per Se-There Ought To Be a Better
Way, 30 Sw. L.J. 523, 552 (1976).
93. See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); Mandeville Island Farms v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1945).
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Number Six, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.9" the plaintiff gas station sued for dam-
ages under sections 1 and 2, attacking a covenant from the lessor shopping
center to the lessee gas station that provided that no other competing gas
stations would be permitted to operate on shopping center property. The
court observed that the plaintiffs "sale of petroleum products at retail at
service stations, considered as an isolated transaction, is local and intra-
state in character."95  Acknowledging case authority that a purely local
transaction can so substantially affect interstate commerce as to invoke the
Sherman Act, and observing that some of the plaintiff station's 300,000
gallon business volume, amounting to $75,000 per year, was purchased di-
rectly from out-of-state producers,96 the court nevertheless implicitly re-
fused to find any substantial effect. It is not clear from its discussion,
however, whether the court did indeed weigh the substantiality of the ef-
fect on interstate commerce and found it to be incidental and inconsequen-
tial, or whether it considered the absence of identifiable intent to restrict
and injure a business9 7 indirectly engaged in interstate commerce to be
decisive.
St. Anthony-Minneapolis, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.98 presents a
slightly clearer example of an early application of the "affecting com-
merce" test to shopping center leases. In that case the plaintiff lessor
sought a declaratory judgment that his predecessor's covenant to the de-
fendant lessee not to lease or sell space to another food supermarket within
the shopping center or any other property within 2,500 feet of the center
was an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1. Conced-
ing that eighty to ninety percent of the $1,800,000 annual volume of prod-
ucts purchased by the defendant supermarket had "some connection with
interstate commerce,"99 the court found that the defendant's business con-
stituted a purely intrastate transaction and the restraint a merely incidental
effect on its conduct. Maintaining that the retail sale of goods is an essen-
tially local event, not unlike the local sale of gasoline purchased from a
distributor in Savon, the court suggested that evidence as to how the de-
fendant supermarket, or more signficantly, a prospective competitor super-
market, would purchase its merchandise would have been appropriate,
although not necessarily dispositive. 1
Recent FTC consent decrees' ° ' provide a sharp contrast to the Savon
and St. Anthony holdings. In Tysons Corner, for example, the Commis-
sion did not analyze possible effects on commerce, but instead declared the
94. 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1962).
95. Id. at 309.
96. Id. at 308. Compare the holding in Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp.,
425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976), that existence of restrictive intent is relevant to the jurisdictional
issue.
97. 309 F.2d at 306.
98. 316 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Minn. 1970).
99. Id. at 1048.
100. Id.
101. See notes 46 & 51 supra.
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course and conduct of the business of the defendant stores 10 2 and the con-
duct of the center's own business to be "in commerce."' 3 This conclusion
was based on the stores' interstate purchase of resale goods, use of adver-
tising circulated among various states, and the resultant continuous flow of
customer services and customers across state lines." Moreover, the
center's own use of advertisements by news media in commerce to solicit
prospective out-of-state tenants, the interstate nature of its lease negotia-
tions and transactions with tenants, and the continuous flow of customers
across state lines to transact business at the center were sufficient to accord
jurisdiction.0 5 In the ensuing City Store litigation, the Commission as-
sumed an ever more intractable stance. Reiterating the particulars of City
Store's business which placed it in commerce-the diverse citizenship of
the parties who employed interstate mail in agreeing to the terms of the
lease, purchases by and deliveries to out-of-state customers, advertising in
interstate media-the Commission declared that Sherman Act jurisdiction
was proper. The fact that the challenged covenants were embodied in a
lease of realty, conventionally considered a local transaction, did not re-
move the agreement from interstate commerce nor immunize it from anti-
trust scrutiny. 0 6 The Tysons Corner progeny have made no more than a
token reference to the jurisdictional issue, merely enumerating sales, size,
or geographic extent of the concerns under examination. 0 7 To the FTC,
at least, jurisdiction is not a difficulty.'08
Whether allegations of interstate sales, advertising, or solicitation of
tenants would satisfy a federal court's concept of "in commerce" jurisdic-
tion is another question. In Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc.' °9 the
plaintiff alleged an unlawful conspiracy in violation of sections 1 and 2 to
prevent the opening of his bowling alley. The asserted basis for jurisdic-
tion rested on his projected initial investment in equipment and supplies
that would be transported through interstate commerce and the defend-
ant's use of interstate advertising to solicit customers. The court, however,
102. Complaint, Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]




106. Final Order, Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, [1973-1976 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 20,933, at 20,777 (1975).
107. See, e.g., cases cited at note 51 supra.
108. The FTC's indifference to jurisdictional particulars can be attributed in part to its
choice of targets. Cf PROCEEDINGS, supra note 84, at 9-10 (discussion of size of defendant
in relation to jurisdictional basis). These large operations have seemed more willing to
settle than to struggle with the Commission; thus far, only City Store has chosen to litigate.
In addition to the FTC's selective aggressiveness, the presumption of administrative exper-
tise works as a barrier to full review and might, on federal review of any Commission deci-
sion, extend to its jurisdictional conclusions. See Flittie, supra note 92, at 540 n. 115.
A competition rule to regulate the shopping center industry seems to be in the offing.
The rule would be promulgated under § 18 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57(a) (1976), created
by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L.
93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975). See FTC UPDATE, supra note 49, at 1-3. Significantly, such a
rule would probably focus on the regional-sized shopping center. Id. at 10.
109. 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964).
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found insufficient involvement in or effects on interstate commerce" l0 to
merit "in commerce" or "affecting commerce" jurisdiction."' In Amajac
Ltd v. Northlake Mall,"2 however, the Georgia district court refused to
grant a motion to dismiss a complaint that alleged that all goods sold were
purchased out-of-state and that the defendant mall used interstate adver-
tising media, implying that the jurisdiction requirement may have been
satisfied. Yet in Sapp v. Jacobs' the Illinois district court held that the
plaintiff developer's jurisdictional assertion did not show a sufficient effect
on interstate commerce. The mere allegation that the defendants had con-
spired to monopolize the regional shopping center business in Springfield
by depriving other developers of anchor stores, thereby unreasonably re-
straining the plaintiffs solicitation of out-of-state tenants, failed to con-
vince the lower court. This decision, however, was reversed, without an
opinion to indicate the appellate court's jurisdictional stance.' 14 On the
basis of such scant case authority, a tentative conclusion that federal courts
would accept the "in commerce" theory of jurisdiction is not warranted.
Whether those courts would be willing to extend "in commerce" jurisdic-
tion to businesses of the magnitude of those which the FTC has chosen to
attack is still an open question.
In any event, the decision in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex
Hospital 115 construing the "affecting commerce" test appears to have low-
ered the jurisdictional hurdle for antitrust challenges to shopping center
leases, at least to the extent of withstanding a motion to dismiss. In Hospi-
tal Building the plaintiff corporate hospital operator alleged that the de-
fendants, a private hospital, two of its officers, and a health planning
agent, had conspired to block the plaintiffs planned expansion with the
intent of monopolizing hospital services in violation of sections 1 and 2.
Reversing the lower courts' dismissal on the pleadings, the Supreme Court
found the plaintiff's averments that it purchased eighty percent of its
medicine and supplies from out-of-state suppliers, that a large portion of
its revenues came from out-of-state insurers of federal programs, that it
paid a management fee to an out-of-state corporation, that its proposed
expansion plans were to be financed in a large part by out-of-state lenders,
and that a substantial number of its patients travelled from other states,
sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce requirement." 6 Neither the
indirectness of the effect on interstate commerce nor the lack of restrictive
purpose was relevant in determining whether the conduct at issue met the
110. Id. at 272.
111. The court observed that, on the evidence presented, the alleged restraint affected
only that commerce involved in the purchase of initial equipment. Unlike the restraints
acknowledged in certain "affecting commerce" cases, this restraint did not affect a continu-
ous flow of materials. The decision suggests that a past history or projected future of inter-
state purchases, rather than one large transaction, is necessary to show involvement with
commerce within the purview of the Act. Id.
112. [1972] TRADE CAS. (CCH) $ 74,099 (N.D. Ga. July 24, 1972).
113. 408 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Ill. 1976).
114. 547 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1977).
115. 425 U.S. 738 (1976), rev'g 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975).
116. Id. at 743-44.
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substantial effect standard.' 17 Nor was this substantial effect measured
against a standard more demanding than that the allegations, if proved,
indicate an unreasonable burden on the free and uninterrupted flow of
interstate commerce. 18 Further, the Court observed that when, as is the
case in antitrust litigation, so much of the proof is in the hands of the
alleged conspirators, a dismissal for failure to state a claim should be rigor-
ously evaluated." 9
The actual impact of Hospital Building on the Sherman Act interstate
commerce requirement is readily apparent from Ballard v. Blue Shield,
Inc.'12  In Ballard the circuit court reversed a dismissal on the pleadings,
finding that unanswered factual questions militated against dismissal. In
effect, the plaintiff chiropractors were given the opportunity to go forward
with discovery in order to prove to what extent, if at all, the defendant's
actions reduced the sale of therapeutic equipment manufactured outside
the state and hence affected commerce. Thus, the antitrust plaintiff who
alleges a restraint on trade must be allowed the opportunity to discover
proof that the trade does bear some requisite relation to interstate com-
merce. Only in the absence of a showing that the challenged conduct
places an unreasonable burden on free and uninterrupted flow of interstate
commerce will jurisdiction be denied.
Precisely what constitutes an allegation of unreasonable restraint on the
free flow of commerce seems to vary with the fact situation. Lieberthal v.
North Country Lanes, Inc.' 21 suggests that there must be a continual flow
of goods or services through commerce, rather than a one time involve-
ment.122 In light of the FTC numbers-oriented decisions,' 23 the observa-
tion in Plum Tree, Inc. v. NK Winston Corp.'24 that "the essence of the
problem is sometimes quantitative rather than qualitative"'' 25 is particu-
larly apt.
A standard based on predictable flow and a numerically demonstrable
quantity is suggested by two recent federal court decisions. In Payless
Drug Stores, Inc. v. City Products Corp.'26 the plaintiff retail store corpora-
tion asserted that the restrictive, exclusive, and protective covenants in the
shopping center's lease of space to a variety store tenant, and the shopping
center's consequent refusal to rent to the plaintiff, violated section 1. The
court found that the interstate nature of activities of the plaintiff and the
defendant and the $4 million in projected annual sales of merchandise in
117. Id. Although the effects in Savon were arguably "merely incidental," this disa-
vowal of the need to show intent seems to undermine its distinguishing rationale. See text
accompanying note 95 supra.
118. 425 U.S. at 746.
119. Id.
120. 543 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1976).
121. 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964).
122. See note 111 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 102-07 supra.
124. 351 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
125. Id. at 88.
126. [1975-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,385 (D. Ore. 1975).
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the plaintiffs prospective store, ninety-five percent of which was to be
purchased outside the state, 2 7 "directly and substantially" affected inter-
state commerce. 128  In Evans v. S S Kresge, 29 a case delayed pending
Supreme Court disposition of Hospital Building, the dollar quantity of out-
of-state purchases was also the touchstone. In Kresge a local food store
operator challenged the licensing practices and coordinated marketing re-
quirements of the defendant discount store operator as an illegal restraint
of trade. Reversing the district court's summary dismissal for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, the court of appeals compared the total dollar vol-
ume of out-of-state purchases to other amounts for which subject matter
jurisdiction had been allowed, and concluded that jurisdiction was man-
dated. 
130
In sum, the "affecting commerce" jurisdictional requirement can appar-
ently be satisfied by a showing of predictable and recurrent out-of-state
purchases. 3' Moreover, the interstate nature of either one or both of the
business concerns, and the inevitable interstate nature of their corollary
transactions, would apparently enhance the degree of substantiality. While
the interstate nature of the business of a shopping center itself may be
more difficult to demonstrate if the center is not located near the major
access highways of several states,' 32 the interstate character of the business
of tenant department stores, especially outlets of national chains, should be
comparatively easy to prove. A frustrated developer might assert both the
interstate character of his proposed tenants and that of his financial and
construction intermediaries to establish such an effect.' 33 The most oner-
ous burden of proof will probably fall to the small, locally owned and
operated satellite store which is less likely to generate the requisite mini-
mal flow of interstate transactions.
IV. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
A. Developments Outside Federal Law
Early English common law suggested that any agreement to refrain
from conducting a lawful trade or business was invalid.' By an early
date, however, such restraints received a qualified legitimacy if they served
127. Id. at 66,678.
128. Id.
129. 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1976), rey'g 394 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
130. Id. at 1189.
131. A mere allegation of dollar volume of purchases that are comparable to or in excess
of the prevailing Sherman Act minimum would be sufficient, according to the Kresge
court's limited reading of Rex Hospital. That the court examined aspects other than pro-
posed sales suggests, however, that jurisdiction based solely on purchases travelling through
interstate commerce might require a substantially greater affected volume than jurisdiction
grounded on other interstate contacts as well.
132. See Complaint, Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, [1970-1973 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,720, at 21,763 (1972), in which this factor was
stressed.
133. See note 175 infra.
134. Baum, Shopping Centers--Lessors' Covenants Restricting Competition, 1965 U. ILL.
L.F. 228, 231. See also Eagle, supra note 23, at 595.
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to promote or induce a legitimate business transaction. 35 An agreement
that neither unduly restricted the activities of the promisor nor harmed the
public interest would be allowed to stand. When American courts consid-
ered restraint of trade problems during the nineteenth century, they fol-
lowed the lead of the English courts. 136  The emergent American rule
indicated that a promise to refrain from competition that is ancillary to a
contract for the transfer of goodwill or other property will not be deemed a
restraint of trade if it is reasonable.
37
In the context of this common law tradition, a radius clause is no more
than the lessee's covenant not to compete with itself or the parent center
for a period of years. As such, the clause should not be deemed to violate
antitrust law unless blatantly unreasonable. What standard of reasona-
bleness a court should invoke is not clear. While the more conventional
radius clause cases involving anticompetition agreements in sale of busi-
ness and employment contract cases provide some guidelines, they fail to
take into consideration the peculiar nature of the shopping center enter-prise. 138
The few appearances of a radius clause before state courts have failed to
clarify the issue. In Irving Investment Corp. v. Gordon 139 the New Jersey
Supreme Court explicitly avoided judicial comment on the extraterritorial
validity of a clause restraining lessees' activities within one-quarter mile of
the leased premises. The court refrained from passing on the lower court's
holding that "the restrictive covenants were invalid and unenforceable
135. See, e.g., Mitchell v. ReynoldS, I P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711) (first
reported case to offer rationale for judicial tolerance of partial restraints).
136. See Baum, supra note 134.
137. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 515(e) (1932).
138. There are two paradigmatic ancillary agreements not to compete. The first is an
agreement by the seller not to initiate a similar business in a prescribed area for a stated
period of time, often as a means of assuring a complementary transfer of goodwill. See
Mitchell v. Reynolds, I P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). An analogous covenant
is that given by a lessor or vendor of land not to lease or sell other real estate to a competing
interest. See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 4 (1964). The second is an agreement by the
buyer that he will not engage in a competing line of business proximate to seller's operations
for a certain period as a means of protecting the seller's vested interest; the shopping center
radius clause falls into this category. See Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
387 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J. 1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 860 (1976)
(although this case involved a Sherman Act challenge to the restrictive covenant, the fact
situation and the court's observation that "a seller of a business or property may legitimately
need to protect himself. . . from injury at the hands of the buyer" epitomizes the classic
model. 397 F. Supp. at 255). Similarly, post-employment covenants restricting a former
employee from engaging in a similar trade within a given area for a specific duration serve
to protect the employer's established business, often more specifically, his competitive ad-
vantage or trade secrets. See generally Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73
HARv. L. REV. 625 (1960).
When assessing the reasonableness of such restraints, the courts have inquired into the
specificity and justifiability of the time and geographic provisions of the covenants. See
generally Annots., 45 A.L.R.2d 77 (1956), 46 A.L.R.2d 119 (1956). Because such covenants
have traditionally dealt with individuals or small business concerns rather than operations
as complex or extensive as regional shopping centers, the precedential value of holdings
construing the reasonableness of a restraint of particular duration or area is limited to the
underlying rationale.
139. 3 N.J. 217, 69 A.2d 725 (1949).
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with respect to any area or place outside the confines of the demised prem-
ises. .. ."40 The court based its decision, instead, on the lack of legiti-
mate business purpose in restrictions on leasehold property by the
corporate lessor for the benefit of another disconnected corporation. In
Alexander's Department Store, Inc. v. Arnold Corp. 4' the New Jersey su-
perior court considered the mirror question whether a successor landlord's
after-acquired land could be bound by the original covenant not to lease to
any of a list of designated stores within a five-mile radius of the leased
premises. The court buttressed its finding that the restriction was reason-
able in time and geographic scope by noting the tenant's reciprocal agree-
ment not to operate a competing store within that same radius for the
period of the lease; as the agreements worked in concert to assure the ef-
fectiveness of the percentage lease, both were implicitly legitimate.' 42
A more recent Texas case is hardly more illuminating. In Neiman-Mar-
cus v. Hexter'43 the defendant shopping center developer persuaded the
defendant specialty department store to relocate at his center by offering to
assume the store's lease at its former location. As a condition of assign-
ment, the developer agreed not to sublease the premises to potentially
competitive stores for a minimum of twenty years.'" Pursuant to its new
lease at the developer's center, the department store agreed not to conduct
any retail business within five miles of the center.' 45 The plaintiffs, own-
ers of the assigned premises, alleged that the two agreements operated in
concert to restrain trade by eliminating competition with the department
store in its new location. The court did not agree, finding that the store's
restriction on the developer's use of the former premises was saved from
antitrust illegality as an exercise of "one of the inherent rights incident to
the ownership of real property."'"6 Almost as an afterthought the court
observed that "the same may be said of' the developer's right to exact
from the lessee a covenant not to compete within a certain area. 47  The
case cited in support of this observation, 48 however, stands for the pro-
position that a lessor has a right to control the use of his premises, thus
casting doubt on the precedential value of Neiman-Marcus.'49
140. 69 A.2d at 727.
141. 105 N.J. Super. 14, 250 A.2d 792 (Ch. 1969).
142. 250 A.2d at 799. Other courts have also been willing to extend such landlord cove-
nants to apply to after-acquired real estate in deference to the unique nature of the shopping
center enterprise. See Carter v. Adler, 138 Cal. App. 2d 63, 291 P.2d 111 (1955); Slice v.
Carozza Properties, Inc., 215 Md. 357, 137 A.2d 687 (1958); Parker v. Lewis Grocer Co., 246
Miss. 873, 153 So. 2d 261 (1963). But see Crest Commercial, Inc. v. Union-Hall, Inc., 104
Ill. App. 110, 243 N.E.2d 652 (1968); Matteuci's Super Save Drug v. Husterd Corp., 158
Mont. 311,491 P.2d 705 (1971); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bailey, 421 Pa. 540, 220 A.2d 1
(1966). See also Eagle, supra note 23, at 616.
143. 412 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. Id. at 916.
145. Id. at 917.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Weinkrantz v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 264 S.W. 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1924, no writ).
149. The full significance of its precedential value might lie in the dearth of any contrary
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Lerner v. Lums"5° involved a suit for a declaratory judgment to deter-
mine the validity of a radius restriction in the lease between Tysons Corner
Regional Shopping Center and Tysons Corner Lumco. The lease prohib-
ited the defendant from operating another restaurant using the name
"LUMS" within a five-mile radius of the shopping center; further, the
gross sales of any operation established in violation of the clause were to
be added to the center's sales for purposes of percentage rent calculation.
Observing that its evaluation need not take into consideration the reasona-
bleness of the restraint over the entire one hundred square miles affected
but only in relation to the location of defendant's offending operation, the
Fairfax, Virginia court of chancery concluded that the disputed restaurant
was located within an area that could "adversely affect" the center and
that the center's objectives in including the restraint were likewise reason-
able.
A Florida appeals court reversed a dismissal of a landlord's complaint
seeking specific performance of a rental compensation clause. The lease
provision involved in Pensacola Associates v. Biggs Sporting Goods Co.'5 '
contained a radius covenant prohibiting conduct of a similar business by
the tenant within three miles of the landlord's premises. This restriction
would not apply, however, if the tenant agreed in writing to add the gross
sales of the second store to those of the first for purposes of determining
the landlord's percentage rental. The tenant opened a second business but
refused to enter into the supplemental agreement prescribed by the lease.
In response to the landlord's attempted enforcement of the covenant, the
tenant asserted that the lease covenant worked to restrain trade and, there-
fore, was void under the applicable Florida antitrust statute. Relying on
federal court reluctance to apply the per se rule to contracts affecting
trade, 5 2 the state court found the landlord's restriction to be reasonable on
its face. Observing that the clause did not work an outright prohibition of
the tenant's second operation, the court noted that the reasonableness of
the clause as a means of protecting the landlord's percentage rental income
could present a question of fact which the tenant would be free to answer
with evidence.
Most recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that a two-
mile radius restriction was reasonable in time, distance, and purpose to
protect the interest of the shopping center developer. In Winrock Enter-
prises, Inc. v. House of Fabrics, Inc.'53 a tenant appealed from a perma-
nent injunction prohibiting the establishment of a branch within the
radius, contending that the clause constituted an unreasonable restraint of
trade. Although some of the center's tenants had succeeded in obtaining
dicta, coupled with authority suggesting the apparent willingness of Texas courts to reform
the terms of noncompetition agreements. See, e.g., Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681
(Tex. 1973) (employment contract).
150. No. 53016 (Va. Ch. Nov. 23, 1977).
151. [1978] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
152. See text accompanying notes 188-90 infra.
153. No. 11,653 (N.M. Sup. Ct. May 10, 1978).
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waivers of the lease restrictions, the court was nevertheless convinced that
only by such restriction could the interests of the landlord and the other
tenants in the center's ability to attract customers be protected. Moreover,
in the court's opinion, the failure of the defendant's store to generate a
sales volume sufficient to trigger the percentage rent provision was not
indicative that the store would not, during the ten-year balance of the
lease, eventually generate such a percentage if the covenant were enforced.
B. The Sherman Act
It is apparent from legislative history'54 and court commentary 55 that
the Sherman Act incorporates common law doctrine. That it incorporates
the common law exception for reasonable restraints which are ancillary to
a legitimate business agreement is indicated by the opinion of then-judge
Taft in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.'56 He acknowledged
that:
[C]ovenants in partial restraint of trade are generally upheld as valid
when there are agreements . . . by the seller of property or business
not to compete with the buyer in such a way as to derogate from the
value of the property or business sold. . . or by the buyer of property
not to use the same in competition with the business retained by the
seller. "7
Subsequently, however, the Court enunciated the doctrine of per se illegal-
ity as a qualification to this exception. Thus, a Sherman Act challenge to
a shopping center radius clause could be framed in terms of an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade under section 1 or some aspect of monopolization
under section 2. The section 1 challenge can take two possible forms: (1)
that the restraint is per se illegal, or (2) that it is illegal when evaluated
under the rule of reason.
Contracts in Restraint of Trade- Section 1.
Per Se Illegality. On its face section 1 declares all restraints of trade to
be illegal, and the earlier cases reflect this rigid interpretation of statutory
language. -8  Then-judge Taft in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States'59 was the first to suggest that section 1 applied only to unreasona-
ble restraints of trade. Not until 1911, however, in United States v. Stan-
dard Oil Co. 160 did the Court clearly announce that section 1 codified the
154. See 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890) (declaration by Senator Sherman that proposed
statutory language, quite similar to that ultimately enacted, does not announce a new princi-
ple of law, but applies old and well recognized principles of common law to the complicated
jurisdiction of state and federal governments).
155. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1940); Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898).
156. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), afd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
157. Id. at 281.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
159. 85 F. at 381.
160. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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common law prohibition against unreasonable restraints 6' in formulating
its classic exposition of the rule of reason. 162 Some restrictions, however,
are so inherently restrictive of trade that they cannot be justified. Northern
Pacflc Railway v. United States163 is the classic articulation of the proposi-
tion that the effect on competition of certain agreements or practices is so
pernicious and without redeeming social value as to warrant conclusive
presumption of illegality without elaborate inquiry into the precise harm
they have caused or any business justification for their use. 164  Northern
Pacific found price fixing, group boycotts, and tying arrangements to con-
stitute such practices; 65 since then, horizontal territorial restrictions 66
have been so classified.
The primary difference between per se and rule of reason allegations is
the kind and quantum of proof required to establish an antitrust viola-
tion. 167 In theory, the per se rule creates an irrebuttable presumption that
the effect of the practice is substantially to restrain trade and that the only
underlying intent is to achieve such anticompetitive effect.168 In practice,
however, no antitrust lawyer will exclusively allege, nor will many courts
decide without further inquiry, 169 that a particular activity is unjustifiably
illegal because it can be labelled a per se restraint. Nevertheless, the attor-
ney seeking to relieve his client of a burdensome restriction will stand a
much better chance of success if he can bring the radius clause within the
ambit of the per se rule. Of the established categories, group boycott, con-
certed refusal to deal and market allocation, horizontal restraint seem to
lend themselves more readily to the task.
The paradigm of the per se case involving group boycott, refusal to deal
is Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC (FOGA). 170 In that
case, the Guild, an organization of firms that designed and manufactured
women's dresses and the textiles used in making them, agreed not to sell to
retailers who also carried garments copied by other manufacturers from
Guild designs. The FTC challenged this agreement as a restraint on inter-
state sales and an attempted monopolization. ' 7 1 Reviewing the Commis-
sion's action, the Supreme Court concluded that the arrangement violated
the Sherman Act.172 The Court was unimpressed with the Guild's argu-
161. Id. at 51.
162. Id. at 61-62.
163. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
164. Id. at 5.
165. Id.
166. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
167. See Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 23, 34 (1964).
168. See Van Cise, The Future ofPer Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1172
(1964). For a comparison of the per se and rule of reason tests, see Carter-Wallace, Inc. v.
United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1381 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
169. See, e.g., Van Cise, supra note 168, at 1173, proposing as an alternate judicial prin-
ciple a rebuttable presumption of anticompetitiveness except for exceptional cases. See
generally Flittie, supra note 92, analyzing the gradual lower court erosion of the articulated
per se rules.
170. 313 U.S. 457 (1941).
171. Id. at 464.
172. Id. at 467.
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ment that its practices were reasonable because necessary to protect its
members from style piracy; it found that the Guild's intent to destroy a
competitor, its potential power, and its tendency to monopolize precluded
a reasonableness or business justification analysis. 173
A comparison between the cumulative effect of radius covenants exe-
cuted by tenants of a shopping center and a group refusal to deal requires
an innovative reading of antitrust law. In the shopping center situation
each tenant has agreed individually with the developer-landlord not to lo-
cate in any other center 174 within a prescribed radial distance of his center.
The composite effect of these individual agreements would appear to be a
collective refusal to deal with any shopping center landlord currently or
prospectively in competition with the developer within a certain geo-
graphic area; this in turn would tend to create a monopoly of shopping
centers, or shopping centers with a particular tenant mix, in that area.'
75
While there is no horizontal agreement in the conventional sense among
the various member stores, arguably there is a "hub" agreement involving
the central developer and the tenant "spokes."
This "rimless wheel" conspiracy theory was recently advanced by the
plaintiffs in Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Department Stores,
inc. 76 to support an antitrust attack on an exclusive dealing arrangement
as a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of sections 1 and 2. Al-
though the evidence in that case was insufficient to establish either con-
spiracy or restraint of trade, the court observed that the theory could be
used in a civil case, provided that the evidentiary requirements of conspir-
173. Id. at 468.
174. Although a tenant may contract not to locate anywhere within the area, business
realities would discourage the free-standing store alternative. See note 83 supra.
175. This proposition appears less naive when posited against a hypothetical fact situa-
tion. Given an established trade area in which the developer landlord operates the only
regional center, that center will cover a trade distance area with maximum driving time of
twenty minutes, or a radius, depending on access, of roughly eight miles. DEVELOPMENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 27. The creation of a new center within that trade area will
not generate more purchasing power than already exists in the trade area, although it may
accommodate new population growth. Instead, if it is successful, it will draw patronage
either by sheer novelty or by offering a supply of goods and services not already available at
existing stores in the trade area. Id. at 29. The developer who, for example, secures a
tenant covenant from his four key anchor stores not to operate a competing store within
eight miles of his center in effect precludes a prospective competitor from so much as initiat-
ing a market study with any one of those four anchors in mind. While the elimination of
four possible key tenants may not significantly lessen the prospective developer's choice of
anchor tenants, it may reduce his selection in a certain range of desirability of image, finan-
cial rating, and pulling power. Further, if the landlord of an existing fashion center, ie., a
conglomeration of apparel stores, boutiques, and one or more specialty department stores
carrying selected high quality merchandise, secures covenants not to compete from his
tenants, then a prospective developer's selection of available tenants may be so limited as to
preclude his development of another fashion center within the radius.
Alternatively, if the competitor shopping center already exists within the radial area, the
competitor landlord's attempts to upgrade his image, a standard device for increasing shop-
ping center productivity, see Eagle, supra note 23, at 626, will be curtailed to the extent that
he will not successfully be able to solicit the participation of any of the clause-restricted
stores.
176. 459 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1972).
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acy were met.' 7 7 The court identified the two elements of such a conspir-
acy to be an overall unlawful plan and knowledge, actual or inferred, that
others must be involved.' 78 Arguably, a plan by the developer to exclude
other developers from proximate competition contravenes the purpose of
the Sherman Act and is unlawful.'79 Knowledge that each other tenant is
likely to be subject to a similar radius clause is more easily imputed to the
larger tenants who, as a condition to their consent to such a disadvanta-
geous lease provision, will demand that other tenants, in particular the
other larger tenants, be similarly restricted. 8 ° Once these two elements
are established, any resultant restraint on operations of a prospective com-
petitor in the area could be said to satisfy the requirements of a group
boycott, concerted refusal to deal.
Alternatively, a vertical combination designed to eliminate competitors
of the developer could be advanced in support of the group boycott theory.
Such an arrangement was recently acknowledged in E.A. McQuade Tours,
Inc. v. ConsolidatedAir Tour Manual Committee 18' to be one of three cate-
gories of per se refusals to deal. A vertical combination among traders at
different marketing levels is designed to exclude from the market direct
competitors of some members of the combination. ' 2 A classic example of
one such situation appeared in Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.'
83
The plaintiff appliance retailer alleged in that case that a competing re-
tailer had induced or coerced leading appliance manufacturers and distrib-
utors to boycott him. Reversing the lower courts' summary judgment, the
Supreme Court held that this concerted action was indeed a boycott and
fell within that class of restraints that are "unduly restrictive, and hence
forbidden.""'' That there was no market-wide impact on competition, as
there were numerous other appliance dealers within the trade area, did not
mean that there was no public injury. The Court determined that since
Congress had delineated the criteria of public harm, the judiciary was not
empowered to reinterpret it; injury to a single merchant was therefore held
sufficient. 8 5
The analogy to the shopping center situation is easily drawn. In return
for inducements such as exclusive clauses or veto provisions,186 particu-
larly in the case of anchor department store tenants, or because of his own
177. Id. at 147.
178. Id. at 146.
179. The purpose of the Sherman Act is the maintenance of a competitive environment.
See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 4 (1958); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940). See also Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 775 (1965).
180. As a simple business reality, no businessman would willingly place himself at a
competitive disadvantage if he wields the bargaining power to demand that his cotenants be
similarly restrained.
181. 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).
182. Id. at 186. See also ANTITRUST ADVISOR 33 (C. Hillis ed. 1971).
183. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
184. Id. at 211.
185. Id. at 213.
186. See Note, supra note 83, at 1232-34.
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superior bargaining power, 18 7 the developer secures commitments from his
tenants not to operate a competing establishment within a certain geo-
graphic area; in effect, these operate as an agreement not to deal with any
of his existing or potential competitors in that area. If, however, even one
competitor is injured by reduction of his sources of tenant supply, though
there may be a multitude of shopping centers in the general area, then
under the reasoning of Klor's, a forbidden injury has occurred.
One qualification to the boycott per se violation has been advanced by
the lower federal courts818 since its Supreme Court articulation in FOGA.
Where there is no showing of exclusionary purpose or coercion, the courts
have been reluctant to apply the per se doctrine. Rather, they prefer to
measure the restraint by the rule of reason test to determine whether it is so
burdensome as to be invalid. This stance was taken in Dalmo Sales Co. v.
Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center' 8 9 in which the plaintiff dis-
counter alleged that his exclusion from the center had resulted from a
group boycott by tenant stores exercising veto powers of their leases.' 90
The court refused to label the tenants' contemporaneous actions per se ille-
gal and, on further inquiry, deemed them to be reasonable. By the Dalmo
standard, the concerted inaction inherent in a radius clause refusal to deal
would be even less amenable to a per se allegation without some showing
of anticompetitive motive and effect.19'
A second basis for challenging a shopping center radius clause as a per
se violation is the market allocation, horizontal restraint theory. The
model for the analysis is United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. 192 In that
case twenty-five independent regional supermarkets organized a coopera-
tive subsidiary corporation to act as their purchasing agent. Each mem-
ber, and each new member,193 agreed to sell Topco brands only within a
designated territory. The government challenged the arrangement on the
grounds that it constituted an illegal territorial division in restraint of
trade,1'4 and the Court concurred. A horizontal restraint, by the Court's
definition, is "an agreement between competitors at the same level of the
market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competi-
tion."' 95  The Court refused to analyze the reasonableness of what it
187. See Kucker, supra note 35, at 45.
188. E.A. McQuade Air Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d
178, 187 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973), is itself one of a line of cases in
which the court avoided using the per se rule. This line is developed and discussed in
Mogul v. General Motors Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1305, 1310-12 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
189. 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C.), a/J'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
190. For discussion of the decision's significance, see Comment, The Antitrust Implica-
tions of Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center Leases, 18 VILL. L. REV. 721, 729 (1973).
191. But see Consent Order, Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, [1973-1976
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,532 (1974).
192. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). In fact, according to Chief Justice Burger's dissent, it is the
first statement of per se market allocation without any element of price fixing. Id. at 619.
This fact is acknowledged by the majority. Id. at 609 n.9.
193. Prospective applicants whose operations were located within one hundred miles of a
member could be approved only by an affirmative vote of 85% of the members. Id. at 602.
194. Id. at 604.
195. Id. at 608.
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termed a naked restraint on trade that sought to foreclose a business' guar-
anteed freedom to compete in any one sector of the economy. 196 That the
horizontal restraint took the form of a vertical arrangement did not ame-
liorate its horizontal effect. An earlier case, which indicates the Court's
willingness to look through the superficial aspects of such arrangements,
and to which Topco refers, is United States v. Sealy, Inc.'9 7 In that case
the horizontal territorial restraint took the form of a vertical licensing
agreement in which Sealy, the licensor, agreed with each manufacturer-
licensee not to license any other business to manufacture or sell Sealy mat-
tresses within a designated area, and they in turn agreed not to operate
outside the area.'
98
The similarities between the Topco and Sealy quasi-vertical arrange-
ments and the shopping center lease situation are superficially apparent.
By its consent to lease terms that include a radius clause, each tenant
agrees to operate only one business within a geographic sector of the com-
munity. This covenant not to locate another store within a particular geo-
graphic area in fact constitutes an agreement by the tenant to compete
neither with his own business nor with any of his competitors at the shop-
ping center. The prospect of increased competition resulting from a
store's decision to locate a second store at another center within the area,
or even to construct a free standing store, poses a threat to the developer's
shopping center income. Arguably, the developer's main purpose in re-
stricting his tenants' competitive alternatives is to prevent any mass exo-
dus, or even general trickle, to a second center whose operations would
inevitably detract from his own.' 99 In effect, this is an agreement not to
increase competition above the status quo, 2°° thereby minimizing competi-
tion within the designated area.
The final product of market allocation, a controlled stabilization of
competition within the geographic area, is the same as that of radius clause
inhibition of tenant expansion. The difficulty in applying this theory to
the shopping center situation, however, lies not in determining the analo-
gous anticompetitive effects that accompany market restriction but in cate-
gorizing the quasi-vertical means by which it is engineered. Both in Seal,
and in Topco the Court found very significant the illusory nature of the
vertical arrangements, particularly the degree to which the same level hori-
zontal members could control the activities of the different level entity.2 'I
196. Id. at 610.
197. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
198. Id. at 352.
199. While the developer might argue that his radial restriction prevents dilution of com-
petition within the area and greatly enhances that within the center itself, the Topco holding
indicates that the Court is not prepared to look beyond per se illegality to weigh such in-
tangibles. See 405 U.S. at 608-10.
200. That there is competition, indeed vigorous competition, within the center is the sine
qua non of shopping center development. The opportunity for comparison shopping inher-
ent in the center's concentrated mix of stores is the primary appeal to the consumer. See
COMMUNITY BUILDER, supra note 4, at 327.
201. In Topco, for example, the board of directors, composed of appointees or high rank-
ing executives of member chains, effectively controlled operations of the association. See
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Tenant stores, especially the satellites, exercise no such control over the
developer-landlord. In the sense, however, that the actions of individual
shopping center tenants are a composite part of the activities of the shop-
ping center as a unified organism2 °2 whose interests coincide with that of
the developer, the actions which "control" the center's profitability "con-
trol" the developer.
Rule of Reason Analysis. The more appropriate test of shopping center
radius clauses is the rule of reason. Unlike per se analysis, a rule of rea-
son analysis carries with it no presumption of harmful effect.2"3 Rather,
the court seeks to measure the effect of the challenged restraint on compe-
tition in ight of any legitimate business concern advanced as justification
for its imposition. Because the shopping center industry is relatively new
to the realm of antitrust analysis, new standards must be developed by
application of established legal principles to a unique set of facts.
Formulating a definition of the relevant market in which to test the ef-
fect on competition is the first step in rule of reason analysis.2" A rele-
vant market has been conventionally defined in dual terms. The first is
the relevant product market, that is, the range of alternative market substi-
tutes for the product whose distribution on the market place is challenged
as an antitrust violation.2"5 The relevant geographic market, the specific
territorial expanse in which the effects of the restraint will be felt, is the
other component.' Those few shopping center cases that have sought to
define a relevant market attempted to evaluate the effect that exclusionary
clauses would have both on the competition in retail goods sold by the
respective stores and on the competition in retail space. In Dalmo Sales
405 U.S. at 598-99. In Sealy, stockholders, in effect the thirty licensees, or stockholder nom-
inees were permitted to serve on the board of directors which managed and-controlled the
business. See 388 U.S. at 352-54.
202. A good example would be tenant activities in a merchants' association, an organiza-
tion generally mandated by lease provision. See Kranzdorf, Shopping Centers--Problems
of the Developer, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 173, 192-93. While the merchants' association may be
charged with a wide range of activities, including parking lot regulation, business referrals,
credit systems, store hours, night openings, centerwide news bulletins, or special newspapers
for trade area distribution, its primary purpose is promotion of the center in order to foster
its growth. DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 145-47.
Cooperative advertising, primarily newspaper and radio advertising, is the
kind of promotion most often used. It is important to advertise the center
because, in the public's mind, the individual shops within the center must be
associated with the image of the center itself. . . . Whatever the promotion
activity, the wider the participation by the tenants, the greater the impact and
success of the promotion.
Id. at 148 (emphasis added). Whether the landlord serves merely as its agent or actively
directs it, the association's operation is largely left to the tenant merchants. Id. at 146; cf
Eagle, supra note 23, at 613 (attributing synergetic qualities to the shopping center).
203. See Loevinger, supra note 167, at 33.
204. See E. CUTLER & G. REILLY, THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF RESTRICTIVE COVE-
NANTS IN SHOPPING CENTER LEASES 16 (1976).
205. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), in
which the Court suggested that to the extent retail products are interchangeable and demon-
strate a cross-elasticity of demand, they constitute a relevant product market.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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Co. v. Tysons Corner Shopping Center2°7 the relevant geographic market
was apparently the mall itself and the relevant product market the retail
space within that mall. In Borman's Inc. v. Great Scott Super Markets,
Inc.2 8 the court held that the plaintiffs failure to establish the market
against which to assess the effects on competition and trade of the chal-
lenged partial exclusionary clause would require it to look solely to the
question whether there had been a foreclosure of market alternatives.
Without a demonstration by the plaintiff that the particular retail space in
the small neighborhood center was so unique that denial of that space
foreclosed all market alternatives,2 °9 in other words, that there were no
"product" substitutes, the court considered the limited restraint to be suffi-
ciently justified by the presence of a valid business reason to limit the
center to two supermarkets. Both the retail space and individual product
markets were factors in the decision in Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc. v. City
Products Corp.2 ' The court appears to have concluded that the trade
area serviced by the challenged shopping center comprised the relevant
geographic market, as exclusion of the plaintiff variety store deprived it of
a sole suitable location. Moreover, the public served by the shopping
center was harmed by deprivation of the competition between "parallel
product lines" '' of the plaintiffs and defendant's variety stores. Al-
though the shopping center cases involving exclusion clauses lend little di-
rect assistance to the radius clause situation, they do indicate that the
conventional product and geographic markets can be adapted to the retail
space model.
Arguably, the relevant geographic market in which the restraint of a
radius clause can be measured has been defined by the developer himself.
At the minimum, it encompasses that area within which competition
would be so acute as to endanger his optimal percentage rental income,
that is, the radial area itself. In the process of assessing the actual physical
area to be restrained, a developer-landlord considers two factors. The first
is the location of his center in relation to established competing centers and
potential areas yet to be developed.2 2 The second is the nature of the ten-
ant. The more desirable the landlord's commodity-the opportunity to be
a part of a shopping center environment-the more willing a tenant will
presumably be to consent to a restriction. Similarly, the fewer available
alternatives, particularly if the center is the only one in the trade area, the
greater the bargaining power the landlord possesses. To a department
207. 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
208. [1975-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,321 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
209. By implication, the court itself defined the relevant market to encompass a general
(geographic) neighborhood area in which alternative supermarket sites were available.
210. [1975-21 TRADE CAS. (CCH) $ 60,385 (D. Ore. 1975).
211. Id. 66,678.
212. In the process of market analysis, the developer will assess the trade area from
which will flow the major portion of the continuing patronage necessary for steady support
of his shopping center. The center's influence on the trade area, that is, its ability to "pull"
customers, is strongest in its primary trade zone and diminishes as distance and driving time
increase. DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 25.
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store, for example, a regional shopping center may be the only desirable
location. By contrast, a fast food store or a supermarket can also elect to
locate at a community center or neighborhood center, or to erect a free-
standing store. Practically speaking, the landlord cannot expect to obtain
as great a restriction from a supermarket as from a department store. 13
Thus, a tenant, whether anchor or satellite, who challenges a radius clause
can look to his lease for a definition of the geographic market. At the
maximum, the geographic market encompasses the area within which the
developer seeks to insulate himself from competition, which arguably ex-
tends as far as the restraints on his anchor tenants, for it is their pull, undi-
luted by competition, which he seeks to protect. Thus, a frustrated
competitor might legitimately assert this broadest range as the area within
which he is restrained from developing.
Similarly, the relevant product market has been defined by the devel-
oper to constitute any existing or potential competitive shopping locations.
Definition of the product market depends generally on the number of
product substitutes, that is, other available retail sites within the geo-
graphic market, and relates specifically to the appropriateness of these sites
for the particular tenant. Understandably, the product market of alternate
retail sites of a large anchor may be quite different from that of a small
satellite. As a general proposition, however, trade in retail space is re-
strained to the extent the shopping center tenant is foreclosed from his
market alternatives. Further, to the extent that stores carrying similar
product lines are prevented from opening new outlets, competition among
goods is also restrained.
Duration of a restraint is one conventional measure of its reasonable-
ness.21 4 The time period, like the geographic area encompassed by the
clause, may vary with each tenant, depending on the potential life of its
lease. For example, it is in the landlord's own best business interest to
limit leases to smaller tenants to a maximum of five years. This enables
him to renegotiate for higher minimum rent, in relation to tenant perform-
ance, or to eliminate poor performance tenants. In contrast, his interest in
securing the drawing power and financial ballast of the department stores
dictates that their leases be for a minimum of twenty years. In between
these extremes are the other major tenants and smaller chain and local
tenants, whose terms range from seven to fifteen years. 2'5 In addition to
the lease term, a tenant might assert that the duration of a restraint in-
cludes renewal options as well.216
Once an analyzing court has assessed the scope of a restraint in the rele-
vant market, it might consider the period during which that restraint
would prevail as a measure of its reasonableness. A five-mile radius
clause that prevents extensive dollar volume of goods from travelling
213. See Tulley, supra note 59, at 331.
214. See note 138 supra.
215. See DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 134-35.
216. See lease provision in Pensacola Assocs. v. Biggs Sporting Goods Co., [1978] 5
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,816, at 73,400 n.l (Fla. Ct. App. 1978).
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through commerce or that hinders other interstate transactions for a period
of twenty years would obviously be far less reasonable than one that inhib-
its only periodic spurts of interstate activity for a brief two-year inter-
lude.217
The second measure of reasonableness is any counterbalancing business
interest that the lessor might assert as justification for the restraint. In the
case of a radius clause the developer might legitimately advance his inter-
est in maximizing the return on his investment; when tenants' rent is deter-
mined on a percentage basis, any dilution in the volume of business
directly affects the rent payable. 218 This justification would be more cred-
ible if the radius clause at issue involves high rental satellite stores. A
related business interest is the developer's desire to prevent any attrition in
the anchor's customer drawing power, since that will affect the volume of
business and hence the productivity of the entire center; this interest would
be most appropriately advanced in support of a radius clause applied to
the lower rental, high volume department stores.
An inquiry into alternative means of achieving the landlord's business
purpose is important to determine its legitimacy as justification for the re-
striction. Assuming the validity of the landlord's contention that a com-
peting second store within the proscribed area would work to the
detriment of his percentage rental income, a court might inquire into alter-
native means of protecting that rental to determine the validity of the ra-
dius clause restraint.
The most obvious alternative is to negotiate the base rent to a satisfac-
tory minimum and eliminate the radius clause. Such a solution, however,
would meet with protest from both tenant and landlord. For the tenant,
the primary appeal of the percentage lease is its responsiveness to business
conditions which, at the commencement of operations, may be such that a
higher fixed base would seriously endanger prospects of success. For the
landlord, its attraction lies in the percentage above base that maximizes his
potential return in the event of successful development and thus maxi-
mizes his promotion incentive.
Another alternative to a radius clause is to levy a penalty percentage on
the sales operations of the second store, a process not unlike the damage
provisions which traditionally have been requested by landlords as a rem-
edy for breach of a radius clause.219 The percentage might vary with the
distance from the center: three percent above base level sales of a second
operation within one mile; two percent where the operation is located one
217. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 84, at 21.
218. This restriction in rental income may well require independent proof. Business
realities suggest that no retailer would intentionally endanger an existing operation. A re-
tail store, particularly a nationwide chain seeking to establish a second base of operations in
the same area, may be advancing its own business interests, such as greater ability to adver-
tise through shared advertising and more efficient shipment of a possibly wider selection of
merchandise, thereby enhancing the profitability of both operations. Cf. PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 84, at 7 (questioning the validity of developer's assertion in the face of tenant's
business decision).
219. See Pollack, supra note 61, at 392.
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to three miles from the center; one percent where it is located three to five
miles away; no percentage if it is located farther than five miles. Indeed,
the developer might devise a formula to measure the radial distances in
terms of total leased area, or perhaps in terms of the type of tenant. 220 A
final, related alternative is to provide that a second operation trigger an
automatic increase in the base22' or that gross sales of the second operation
be added to those of the first.222
Irrespective of the lack of appeal they may hold for the landlord, the
reasonableness of these alternatives depends in large part on the legitimacy
of his claim to share proportionately in the center's success in addition to
receiving a minimum assured rental income. The landlord's entitlement
to such "incentive income" is an issue that has been dealt with only pe-
ripherally by the courts, principally in landlord- suits for percentage in ad-
dition to base rental after the tenant has abandoned the premises. Early
cases discussed the parties' intent as to the function of the guaranteed min-
imum. 2 23 Where the guaranteed rental was less than the fair rental value
of the location, a covenant to continue operations has been implied and
damages accorded the lessor for the breach.224 Where, however, the par-
ties could not be presumed to have bargained with respect to the lessee's
earning potential, 225 or where the base in itself was sufficient, in the court's
view, to accord the landlord his due,22 6 such implied covenants have been
denied.
The issue of sufficiency has, however, received less than enlightening
articulation. Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem22' qualifies the general proposi-
tion that a greater than nominal minimum militates against the implica-
tion that the parties contracted for continuous operation.228 In instances
where the rent, though larger than a nominal minimum, is significantly
below the fair rental value of the property, the parties could well have
intended that the lessee operate during the lease to provide the lessor with
the benefit of the percentage. The burden of demonstrating such disparity
220. Some demonstrable attempt on the part of the developer to correlate the restraint to
the nature of the tenant, whether by formula incorporated in the lease or on an ad hoc basis,
would seem to make it less suspect as a promotion of his valid business interest.
221. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 84, at 21.
222. See lease provision in Pensacola Assocs. v. Biggs Sporting Goods Co., [1978] 5
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,816, at 73,400 n.l (Fla. Ct. App. 1978).
223. See, e.g., Percoff v. Solomon, 259 Ala. 482, 67 So. 2d 31 (1953); Professional Bldg.
v. Anita Frocks, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 2d 276, 2 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1960); Masciotra v. Harlow,
105 Cal. App. 2d 376, 233 P.2d 586 (1951); Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45
Cal. App. 2d 141, 113 P.2d 878 (1941); Berland Realty Co. v. Hahne & Co., 26 N.J. Super.
477, 98 A.2d 124 (Ch. 1953).
224. See, e.g., Simhawk Corp. v. Egler, 52 Ill. App. 2d 449, 202 N.E.2d 49 (1964); Slid-
dell Inv. Co. v. City Prod. Corp., 202 So. 2d 323 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
225. See, e.g., Weil v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 281 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1955, writ ref d); Palm v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 229 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1950, no writ).
226. See Kroger Co. v. Bonny Corp., 134 Ga. App. 834, 216 S.E.2d 341 (1975).
227. 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248 (1964).
228. 200 N.E.2d at 251.
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between base and fair rental, however, is on the lessor.229 The lessor in
Fox v. Fox Valley Trolling Club231 successfully recovered his percentage
income after the tenant had moved operations to another location while
continuing to pay the base. From the circumstances of the transaction the
court had no difficulty in finding the percentage rental to be material; the
parties' knowledge of the prior rental value, that it was insufficient to
cover interest and taxes, and that the agreed base rent would provide only
one and two-thirds percent on the lessor's investment, in addition to ancil-
lary lease provisions, seemed to be important factors in the court's conclu-
sion. In contrast, the court in Kretch v. Starkz32 refused to imply such
a covenant, finding that the base provided lessor a sixteen percent return
on his investment which was undeniably substantial.
Arguably, the shopping center landlord seeking to justify his radius
clause as insuring his rental income will need to establish not only that the
shopping center would be adversely affected, but also that he has a legiti-
mate interest in protecting it from such adverse effects. Theoretically, the
landlord sets the fixed minimum to assure sufficient return to cover fixed
costs and to provide a set return on his initial investment.233 In a situation
where the landlord has trimmed his rental to the bare bones of financing,
maintenance, taxes, plus a fixed return on investment, his argument for
entitlement to the percentage as a hedge against inflation would be his
strongest weapon. Even though special lease provisions, such as escalator
clauses and the establishment of a formula for shared common area
charges and real estate taxes, may be included to assure the adequacy of
the minimum rent structure,234 the landlord's calculated return on invest-
ment will at best remain static. A court might measure the adequacy of
the base by comparing the landlord's return on investment to the prevail-
ing standard for the industry. Depending on the history of the landlord's
financing arrangements, the base may indeed supply a satisfactory return
on investment.235 According to Ganem, the landlord's burden would be
to demonstrate that because of the center's choice location and optimal
tenant mix, its fair rental value as premium retail space far exceeds that
fixed minimum. Should the landlord fail to satisfy this burden, a court
might well declare the percentage to be no more than a premium to which
he has no legitimate business claim in light of the concomitant restraint
necessary to insure it.
The landlord's asserted right to ensure that his tenants devote all their
efforts to the shopping center and his right to preserve the composite pull-
ing power of the shopping center is not without validity. The developer of
a recently opened center might legitimately contend that its economic sur-
229. Id. at 252.
230. 8 Ill. 2d 571, 134 N.E.2d 806 (1956).
231. 134 N.E.2d at 808.
232. 26 Ohio Op. 2d 385, 193 N.E.2d 307 (1962).
233. Landis, supra note 65, at 190.
234. See DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 132.
235. Landis, supra note 65, at 190.
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vival depends on the undiluted pull of all tenants working exclusively to
promote its success.236 Once the center has become established within the
trade area, however, such restrictions on other operations smack of anti-
trust. A more reasonable solution would be to sever the radius clause
duration from that of the lease and limit the time of the restriction to a
span which, in combination with the geographic scope, would assure the
initial survival of the center.
Clearly, the validity of such business justifications and the practicality of
alternatives will be peculiar to the given fact situation. Generally, a court
might be expected to assess the reasonableness of the landlord's existing
restraints in light of any alternate means of securing his legitimate business
purpose. To this end the court would compare the extent, both in terms of
geographic and product market and duration, of the restraint. Presuma-
bly, if the radius clause is the only effective means to protect the lessor's
legitimate rental income and is necessary to ensure the survival of the
center itself, he is on fairly strong footing. A store which has no realistic
alternatives within the geographic market and which will be restrained to
the radial area only for a reasonably limited -period would have little cause
to complain. Whether the same can be said of an anchor tenant who is
foreclosed from the only alternative shopping center within the area or a
prospective developer who is discouraged from opening a second center is
another question.
Monopolization.- Section 2. An alternative antitrust challenge to a shop-
ping center radius clause could be rooted in the section 2 prohibition
against attempts, conspiracies, and actual monopolization. In contrast to
section 1, which requires concerted action, section 2 requires only a show-
ing of anticompetitive action by one party. Justice White in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States237 observed that section 2 has a "somewhat broader
reach" than section 1 since it could apply to an attempt to monopolize that
had not as yet resulted in an unreasonable restraint.238 In practice, how-
ever, section 2 seems to require a greater degree of proof.
239
The two elements of monopolization are: (1) possession of monopoly
power, and (2) attainment of that power by unfair means or use of that
power for the purpose of excluding competition. 24 Monopoly power is
generally defined as the power to fix or control prices or the power to
exclude competition.24' Its existence is determined by examination of the
effect of competition on the relevant market. Early cases gauged monop-
oly power by its predatory exercise,242 while later cases played mystifying
236. Cf. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 84, at 20 (query whether a clause whose only pur-
pose is to insulate center against possible financial ruin by tenant's opening of second store
would be supportable).
237. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
238. Id. at 61.
239. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
240. See E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 101 (2d ed. 1973).
241. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
242. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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numbers games to determine what degree of market control could safely
be entrusted to a single enterprise.243 Modern courts, on the other hand,
seek to determine on the basis of relevant economic data and analysis
whether the market strength and power of the challenged entity are com-
patible with society's enjoyment of the fruits of competitive enterprise. 2"
The requisite unfair intent to attain or exercise that power can be inferred
from either actual monopolization or a dangerous probability of monopo-
lization.245  An allegation that a developer's across-the-board imposition
of radius clauses constitutes an attempt to monopolize the shopping center
market within the relevant market area is easier to articulate than to estab-
lish. If the landlord's center is the only one in the relevant area, it might
be charged that he has monopolized the market of shopping centers within
that area. Yet without a showing of both an attempt by a potential com-
petitor to develop in the area and the failure of that attempt due to en-
forcement of the radius clause, it would be difficult to establish requisite
intent. Further, the landlord might legitimately assert that his market posi-
tion has been thrust upon him as the original entrant into a new market.246
The high fashion or specialty store landlord might similarly be charged
with monopolizing or attempting to monopolize the market in such stores
if no other shopping centers exist within the trade area. Once again, how-
ever, it would be difficult to establish that this state of affairs is intentional.
The different images, and consequently the different characters of trade
populations, which result when several shopping centers coexist in a trade
area, might be the cause. 247 Moreover, the developer might legitimately
assert that the situation is a product of his superior skill in shaping the
personality of his center. The prospective difficulties in proving the devel-
oper's monopolistic intent248 suggest that this antitrust challenge would be
a mere make-weight in comparison to the section 1 attack.249
V. CONCLUSION
A definitive challenge to the radius clause provision in shopping center
leases is close at hand. The provision's prospects of survival without mod-
243. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 116, 424 (2d Cir.
1945).
244. Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 930, 933
(1962).
245. See 16 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATIONS § 7.0[1] (1977).
246. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir.
1945).
247. See Eagle, supra note 23, at 612, 626.
248. A telling footnote in the COMMUNITY BUILDER, supra note 4, suggests, however,
that there may indeed be such intent. The comments of an executive group member of the
Urban Land Institute Community Builder's Council as to the kind and extent of data re-
quired of a landlord by a mortgage lender indicates this would include information as to
competition, ie., competitive sites or monopolistic positions, because "It]he lending institu-
tion wants satisfactory evidence to support a successful operation." Id. at 289 n.25.
249. Handler, Nineteenth Annual Review of Recent Antitrust Developments--1966, 21
REc. A.B.N.Y. 539, 554 (1966).
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ification would appear to depend on who is the initiator and the nature of
the challenge. Should the FTC institute the challenge, its victim is likely
to be a regional or super-regional center whose very size may obviate any
jurisdictional difficulties. How extensive a restraint on trade or how im-
minent a threat of per se illegality the FTC will be prepared to find will
depend on the terms of the clause and the legitimacy of any asserted busi-
ness purpose. By contrast, the private challenger, whether anchor store,
satellite, or prospective developer, will face the far more demanding task
of establishing to the satisfaction of the federal court that the requisite ef-
fect on interstate commerce is sufficient to invoke its jurisdiction and that
the concomitant burden is sufficiently detrimental to the public to merit
interference.
The developer-lessor facing an antitrust challenge should be prepared to
substantiate his business justifications. If invalidation of a radius clause
would result in diversion of sales and consumer traffic, this diversion
should be statistically demonstrable. Further, the developer should be
prepared to demonstrate that his radius clause provision is the least restric-
tive means of achieving his business purpose. Some indication that he has
attempted to tailor the clause to the particular tenant and the trade area
will strengthen his assertion of reasonableness. On balance, the more lim-
ited the geographic range and duration of the clause, the less unreasonably
restrictive such a clause will appear. From a practical standpoint, the
landlord should provide for the severability of the radius clause so that, in
the event of an adverse court disposition, the tenant will not be able to
assert illegality as a means of avoiding the lease.
An attack on the radius clause, from whatever source, will raise serious
questions about long-established conventions in the shopping center space
leasing business. The most prominent by far is the entitlement of the
landlord developer to a dollop of cream in addition to his dole of milk. If
the prospects of percentage income are the primary incentive for shopping
center development, the outcome of the controversy could have serious
implications for the industry itself. Should the inquiring court analyze the
clause by the rule of reason, as it doubtless will, this weighty policy consid-
eration might bear significantly on the court's decision, especially where
the actual public harm in terms of reduction of competition is negligible.
If, however, the percentage rate contention is a spurious argument, radius
clause litigation may put to rest an illegitimately exploitative practice.
The perspicacity with which an inquiring court probes the issues will be
crucial in determining the continued validity of the radius clause in shop-
ping center leases.
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